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Resumo		Neste	artigo,	pretendo	apresentar	uma	nova	interpretação	da	desobediência	civil	 com	 o	 objetivo	 de	 revelar	 seu	 potencial	 na	 construção	 de	 uma	democracia	 radical	 anticapitalista.	 Depois	 de	 discutir	 as	 diferenças	 entre	poder	constituinte	e	desinstituinte,	ambos	ativados	pela	desobediência	civil,	o	 estudo	 conclui	 indicando	 algumas	 características	 e	 formas	 de	desobediência	 civil	 que	 podem	 ser	 vistas	 como	 exemplos	 de	 um	 poder	constituinte	e	desinstituinte.	
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Abstract	In	this	paper,	I	aim	to	present	a	new	interpretation	of	civil	disobedience	with	the	objective	of	revealing	its	potential	in	the	construction	of	an	anti-capitalist	radical	democracy.	After	discussing	the	differences	between	constituent	and	dis-instituting	power,	both	of	which	are	activated	by	civil	disobedience,	 the	study	concludes	by	 indicating	some	of	 the	characteristics	and	forms	of	civil	disobedience	 that	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 images	 of	 constituent	 and	 dis-instituting	power.	
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Constituent/dis-instituting	power		 This	text	is	intended	to	develop	the	idea	of	civil	disobedience	as	a	meeting	point	between	constituent	power	and	dis-instituting	power.	This	study	will	examine	the	relationship	between	these	two	traditions	from	a	new	angle,	 in	order	to	deepen	the	current	critique	of	–	and	fight	against	–	capitalism.	It	is	important	to	note	at	this	stage	that	my	use	of	the	term	‘dis-instituting	power’	differs	both	from	Agamben’s	“destituent	potential”	(potenza	destituente)	and	Rafaelle	Laudani’s	 “destituent	 power”	 (potere	 destituente).	 In	 the	 introduction	 to	 Disobedience	 in	
Western	Political	Thought:	A	Genealogy	 it	 is	made	 clear	 that	Laudani’s	 concept	of	destituent	power	 bears	 no	 relation	 to	 the	 tradition	 of	 civil	 disobedience.	 In	 fact,	 he	 classifies	 this	tradition,	 originating	 in	 the	 1970s,	 as	 a	 “mistake”,	 a	 mere	 liberal	 attempt	 at	 limiting	 and	taming	destituent	power.	Moreover,	 Laudani	 admits	 that	his	 concept	of	 destituent	power	 is	not	hostile	 towards	existing	 institutions	of	 the	current	political-legal	order,	classifying	 it	not	as	 anti-institutional,	 but	 rather	 as	 extra-institutional.	 There	 are,	 therefore,	 two	 important	differences	 to	 be	 highlighted	 between	 the	 proposition	 set	 out	 in	 this	 study	 and	 Laudani’s	concept.	 Dis-instituting	 power,	 as	 understood	 in	 this	 article,	 is	 specifically	 related	 to	 the	rejuvenation	of	 the	civil	disobedience	 tradition	 today,	 irrespective	of	 its	 liberal	 roots,	and	 is	clearly	an	anti-institutional	proposition.		It	is	also	important	to	clarify	that	this	understanding	of	dis-instituting	power	is	not	to	be	confused	with	Giorgio	Agamben’s	notion	of	destituent	potential,	despite	 their	 resemblances.	This	 comes	 down	 to	 one	 simple,	 fundamental	 reason:	 Agamben	 conceives	 of	 destituent	potential	as	what	he	calls	pure	“inoperativity”.	By	inoperativity	he	does	not	mean	inertia,	but	rather	an	activity	capable	of	deactivating	both	the	legal	and	political	mechanisms,	which	are	marked	 by	 their	 inherent	 violence,	 freeing	 up	 these	 mechanisms	 for	 new	 utilizations.	Agamben	conceives	of	destitution	as	a	 reality	 that	has	no	 connection	 to	 institutions,	 i.e.,	 the	production	paradigm.	Thus,	inoperativity	means	“not	to	operate”;	that	is,	ceasing	production.	Within	this	idea	we	see	the	possibility	that	all	constituent	power	derives	from	the	original	sin	of	violence	and	the	division	between	an	ordered	dimension	–	archic	–	and	a	disordered	one	–	
anarchic.	 Based	 on	 this	 interpretation,	 Agamben	 presents	 the	 dualisms	 of	 potestas	 and	
auctoritas;	life	and	law;	non-political	and	political	life;	human	and	animal;	kingdom	and	glory,	among	 many	 others	 (Agamben,	 2015,	 p.	 334-336).	 From	 these	 dyads	 stem	 an	 exceptive	structure,	which	 renders	 them	 indiscernible	 by	 incessantly	 exerting	 power	 over	 them.	 This	divides	factitious	experience	through	a	movement	of	exclusive	inclusion,	according	to	which	a	specific	 dimension	 –	 fundamental	 rights,	 for	 example	 –	 can	 be	 conceivable	 or	 politically	relevant	 only	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 differentially	 included	 in	 the	 system	 as	 an	 ex-capere	 (“taken	outside”,	ex-ceptio)	 to	 the	exception	 itself.	 In	 the	given	example,	 this	 implies	 that	 rights	 can	only	be	guaranteed	through	legitimization	of	the	State’s	violence,	which	affirms	them.		According	 to	 Agamben,	 a	 constituent	 power	 capable	 of	 transforming	 the	 legal-political	reality	–	as	in	the	Western	tradition	since	the	French	Revolution	–	means	nothing	more	than	a	change	of	lords	and	masters,	since	a	power	overthrown	by	constituent	violence	will	only	rise	again	 under	 a	 different	 form.	 Under	 such	 a	 hypothesis,	 the	 dialectic	 between	 law-making	violence	 (constituent	 power)	 and	 law-keeping	 violence	 (constituted	 power)	 has	 not	 been	deactivated.	Thus,	for	Agamben,	constituent	and	constituted	power	form	one	system,	so	that	the	constituted	is	founded	on	the	constituent.	The	constituent	–	initially	seen	as	a	power	that	occurs	outside	the	State	and	which	continues	to	exist	even	after	being	constitutionalized	–	is	eventually	 subsumed	 by	 the	 instituted	 power,	 surviving	 only	 as	 the	 power	 to	 revise	 the	Constitution,	as	clearly	stated	 in	Sieyès’	 classical	definition	(Agamben,	2015,	p.	336-337).	 In	
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order	 to	 avoid	 such	 paradoxical	 redundancy,	 Agamben’s	 theory	 demands	 we	 abandon	 the	symbiotic	 and	 repeating	 system	 of	 constituent/constituted	 power	 and	 instead	 turn	 to	 the	radical	inoperativity	of	destituent	potential,	as	it	does	not	produce	work	(opera)	–	and	is,	thus,	not	violent	–	but	only	deactivates	already	existing	works,	preparing	them	for	a	new	usage	in	accordance	 with	 what	 Walter	 Benjamin	 calls	 destitution	 (Entsetzung)	 (Agamben,	 2015,	 p.	339-341).		However,	there	are	a	number	of	misconceptions	in	Agamben’s	argument,	which	will	now	be	examined.	First,	this	symbiotic	relationship	between	constituent	and	constituted	power	is	a	historical	fact,	and	not	an	ontological	one.	It	would	certainly	be	possible	to	create	and	activate	a	constituent	power	which,	as	indicated	by	its	name,	would	not	be	subsumed	or	limited	by	the	constituted	 power.	 Imagine	 a	 permanent	 constituent	 power,	 permanent	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	will	 never	 give	 way	 to	 fixed	 institutions	 which	 could	 be	 legitimized	 under	 the	 label	 of	 the	“constituted	 power”.	 Imagine	 further	 that	 this	 permanent	 constituent	 power	 has	 no	hierarchical	 relationship	 with	 the	 constituted	 power	 and	 opposes	 itself	 to	 it.	 There	 is	 no	reason	to	assert	that	every	institution	will	necessarily	propagate	the	original	law-making	and	law-keeping	violence	of	the	arché.	It	is	thus	fundamental	to	conceive	of	a	dis-instituting	power	capable	 of	 deactivating	 the	 institutions	 of	 capital,	 State	 and	 market.	 Such	 a	 power,	 unlike	Agamben’s	 destituent	 potential,	 is	 closely	 related	 to	 constituent	 power,	 not	 the	 former	represented	 a	 logical	 step	 towards	 the	 latter,	 but	 because	 the	 dis-instituting	 power	 is	 a	necessary	 structure,	 required	 to	 destroy	 the	 constituted	 power	 and	 substitute	 it	 for	 a	permanent	and	continuous	constituent	power.	Agamben	believes	 that	 the	dialectic	between	 the	 constituent	power	and	 the	 constituted	power	must	be	abandoned	completely	through	destituent	potential,	whereas	the	proposition	outlined	here	aims	to	break	the	historical	and	rhetorical	links	between	the	constituted	and	the	constituent	 power,	 releasing	 the	 latter	 from	 the	 former.	 In	 order	 to	 accomplish	 this,	 a	 dis-instituting	force	is	required,	one	that	goes	against	both	the	institutional	and	concrete	aspects	of	capitalism	and	of	the	State,	making	room	for	the	production	of	new	subjectivities,	new	uses	and	 new	 forms	 of	 law,	 which	 will	 stem	 from	 the	 permanent	 constituent	 power.	 Unlike	 in	Agamben’s	theory,	this	should	not	be	seen	as	a	mere	expression	of	the	violence	of	the	nómos.	On	the	contrary,	the	constituent	power,	as	an	originally	rebellious	force,	involves	a	productive	surplus	 that	 cannot	 be	 contained	 by	 the	 institutional	mechanisms	 of	 the	 constituted	 power	(Negri,	2015,	p.	19-20).	Dis-instituting	 power	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 an	 escape	 or	 exodus	 from	 the	 institutional	forms	through	which	the	contemporary	political-economic	power	expresses	itself,	translated	into	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 State,	 banks	 and	 global	markets.	 Though	 every	 constituent	 act	necessarily	 involves	 dis-instituting	 dynamics,	 the	 radical	 nature	 of	 this	 critique	 intends	 to	highlight	 that	 the	 entire	 current	political	 and	 legal	 system	 requires	dis-institution	under	 its	own	terms,	bearing	in	mind	that	it	is	not	a	mere	logical	step	towards	future	constitutions.	The	 desire	 for	 freedom	 does	 not	 translate	 into	 the	 dialectic	 between	 constituent	 and	constituted	power;	rather,	it	concerns	the	horizontal	relationship	between	the	dis-instituting	power	and	the	permanent	constituent	power.	 If	 the	historical	ascension	of	Western	law	was	indeed	 grounded	 in	 violence-based	 hierarchy	 and	 appropriation	 –	which	 is	 undeniable	 –	 it	does	not	necessarily	follow	that	 it	must	remain	so,	and	that	all	productiveness	 is	marked	by	this	arché.	By	perpetuating	such	a	thesis	–	i.e.,	the	indissolubility	of	the	existing	bond	between	violence,	 production	 and	 constitution	 –	 history	 can	 be	 mistaken	 for	 ontology,	 blocking	concrete	possibilities	for	social	change.	Things	do	not	have	to	remain	as	they	are,	for	history	is	the	work	of	mankind	and	not	an	external	and	endlessly	self-replicating	form.	Amongst	these	ontologies,	 as	 Agamben	 is	 perhaps	 aware,	 there	 remain	 those	 which	 allow	 for	 possibility,	
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openness	 and	 “preferring	 not	 to”,	 in	 the	 words	 of	 Bartleby	 the	 Scrivener.	 The	 eternal	productive	 struggles	 of	 the	 oppressed	 for	 an	 an-archic	 reality	 –	 that	 is,	 one	 that	 does	 not	separate,	appropriate	and	establish	hierarchy	–	are	founded	upon	such	possibilities.	While	every	political	action	involves	inherent	risk,	circumstances	are	not	entirely	down	to	chance.	 The	 constitution	 of	 new	 political	 and	 legal	 structures	 through	 popular	 constituent	power,	which	necessarily	begins	with	the	dis-institution	of	the	old	capitalist	forms,	indicates	the	assumption	of	a	new	world	view	by	the	 true	holders	of	political	power.	The	rejection	of	what	 is	 there	 –	 the	 apparatuses	 established	 by	 capital	 and	 based	 on	 hierarchy	 and	appropriation	–	is	equivalent	to	the	creation	of	a	reverse	route.	There	is	the	sense	of	an	open	future	 in	 which	 nothing	 is	 taken	 for	 granted,	 but	 where	 continuing	 to	 live	 under	 a	 global	political-legal-economic	 system	 which	 threatens	 the	 very	 physical	 existence	 of	 the	 planet	becomes	an	impossibility.	In	other	words,	one	cannot	know	what	will	stem	from	constituent	power,	 since	 its	 potentialities	 are	 immeasurable	 and	 relatively	 undetermined.	 Nonetheless,	one	may	assert,	based	on	the	possibility	of	dis-instituting	power,	that	this	new	world	need	not	resemble	the	current	capitalist	system.		In	 contrast	 to	 constituent	 power	 –	which,	 in	 the	modern	 paradigm,	 corresponds	 to	 the	idea	 of	 sovereignty,	 with	 the	 unpredictable	 potential	 to	 create	 new	 forms	 that	 cannot	 be	known	 in	 advance	 dis-instituting	 power	 presents	 itself	 as	 negative	 content.	 It	 has	 the	possibility	of	being	updated	by	denying	the	structures	of	existing	institutional	apparatuses.	In	fact,	even	if	the	material	reality	of	a	post-capitalist	world	is	presently	unknowable,	in	order	to	conceive	 of	 it,	 one	must	 abandon	 the	 historical	 project	 of	 conquering	 the	 structures	 of	 the	State,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 powers	 that	 intend	 to	 make	 us	 think	 we	 live	 under	 “respectable	democracies”	(Jappe,	2015,	p.	121).	As	Furio	Jesi	accurately	notes	in	his	legendary	study	on	the	symbology	and	mythology	of	revolt,	 one	of	 the	most	 appalling	accomplishments	of	 capitalism	 is	 the	 transformation	of	 its	own	 structures	 into	 effective	 patterns	 and	 symbols	 of	 strength.	 In	 this	 dynamic,	 all	organizations	 that	 criticize	 and	 try	 to	 defeat	 it,	 such	 as	 left-wing	 parties	 and	 unions,	 feel	inexorably	 compelled	 to	 reproduce	 its	 forms,	 as	 if	 they	 existed	 outside	 of	 history	 and	represented	 non-contingent	 symbols	 of	 power	 (Jesi,	 2014,	 p.	 87-88).	 Like	 all	 false	mythologies,	 the	 one	 concerning	 capitalist	 power	 in	 fact	 corresponds	 to	 a	 mere	 historical	accident,	without	involving	any	extra-historical	truth.	In	this	context,	the	dis-instituting	power	becomes	 a	 force	 where	 the	 creation	 of	 space	 for	 new	 possibilities	 makes	 the	 process	 of	historicizing	 capitalism	possible	 and,	 therefore,	makes	 room	 for	 radical	 critique	 and	debate	around	 it.	 In	order	 to	 fulfill	 this	 role,	 the	dis-instituting	power	needs	 to	be	conceived	under	the	 terms	 of	 its	 own	 ontological	 radicality,	 and	 not	 as	 a	 simple	 negative	 simile	 of	 the	constituent	 power,	 especially	 when	 the	 latter	 is	 understood	 as	 the	 sovereign	 assertion	 of	peoples	 or	 States,	 as	 is	 generally	 asserted	 by	 constitutionalists.	 A	 new	 political	 lexicon	 is	needed	 so	 that	 the	 term	 “sovereign”	 –	 and	 especially	 the	 mytheme	 “sovereign	 people”	 –	becomes	 inactive,	 improper,	 inauthentic	and	useless	 for	any	purpose	other	 than	domination	and	social	division.	This	 point	 is	 important	 and	 should	 not	 be	 underestimated.	 It	 seems	 dangerous	 to	conceive	 of	 constituent	 power	 in	 a	 formal	 and	 empty	way	under	 the	modern	 constitutional	paradigm	of	 sovereignty,	whose	greatest	 theorist	was	Carl	Schmitt.	Due	 to	 its	openness	and	indeterminacy,	the	constituent	power	could	create	any	type	of	society.	This	demonstrates	that	constituent	power	is	certainly	not	a	remedy	for	all	ills,	and	its	action	could	even	lead	mankind	into	 a	 more	 authoritarian	 regime	 than	 those	 imposed	 by	 capitalism.	 Such	 a	 consequence	would	 be	 inevitable	 and	would,	 in	 fact,	 constitute	 the	 political	 character	 of	 the	 constituent	power.	 Indeed,	 the	 concept	 of	 politics	 is	 not	 to	 be	 identified	 with	 the	 definition	 and	
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characterization	 of	 the	 enemy,	 but	 rather	 with	 an	 attempt	 to	 order	 the	 contingency	 and	indeterminacy	typical	of	social	structures.	Thus,	political	action	involves	an	inherent	gamble.	That	is	the	true	tragic	nature	of	constituent	power.		Nevertheless,	as	previously	stated,	this	is	not	a	blind	bet.	If	constituent	power	is	based	on	indeterminacy	 and	 openness,	 and	 may	 therefore	 result	 in	 any	 social	 arrangement,	 some	possibly	worse	than	capitalism,	then	it	 is	necessary	to	guarantee	a	minimal	 level	of	security.	According	to	this	proposal,	confidence	in	this	risk	can	only	be	guaranteed	when	conceiving	of	–	and	practicing	–	 constituent	power	 in	 relation	 to	dis-instituting	power.	Unlike	 constituent	power,	dis-instituting	power	is	neither	open	nor	indeterminate,	but	actually	configured	by	the	reality	 it	 denies.	 The	 dis-instituting	 power	 is	 defined	 by	 existing	 institutions,	 continually	presenting	 an	 inversion.	 What	 the	 dis-instituting	 power	 dis-institutes	 is	 the	 minimal	 basis	upon	which	 the	 constituent	power	will	 start	 acting.	 Indeed,	 the	 constituent	power	 could	be	anything,	 apart	 from	 what	 has	 been	 denied	 by	 the	 dis-instituting	 power,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	coherent	 political	 project	 being	 at	 stake.	 Following	 a	 similar	 line	 of	 thought,	 Antonio	Negri	states	 that,	 currently,	 the	 constituent	 power	 should	 not	 be	 conceived	 of	 as	 an	 empty	potentiality,	since	there	is	no	“inside”	and	“outside”	in	post-modernity:	every	political	force	is	closely	attached	 to	 the	present	historicity.	Thus,	 the	meanings	of	 the	constituent	power	will	always	 be	 determined	 by	 the	 resistances	 and	 singularities	 against	 which	 it	 collides	 (Negri,	2015,	p.	19).	Institutions	such	as	 the	State,	banks,	 stock	exchanges,	private	property,	 inheritance	and	contracts,	after	having	been	dis-instituted,	cannot	be	reconfigured	by	the	constituent	power,	whose	 infinite	malleability	will	 confront	 the	 limit	of	 the	order	previously	denied	by	 the	dis-instituting	power.	Thus,	 it	 is	possible	–	 though	not	without	risks	–	 to	seriously	consider	 the	wish	to	build	a	more	decent	society,	different	from	the	dis-instituted	one.	The	dis-instituting	power	 provides	 a	 guarantee	 against	 a	 return	 to	 capitalism,	 opening	 up	 a	 vast	 field	 of	possibilities	in	which	–	even	though	nothing	can	be	taken	for	granted	–	some	alternatives	are	necessarily	 excluded,	 having	been	proven	 to	be	unacceptable	 from	an	 ethical	 point	 of	 view.	For	example,	there	can	be	no	ethical	justification	for	subjugating	99%	of	humanity	to	the	1%	of	 individuals	 and	 companies	 which	 dominate	 political	 and	 economic	 power.	 Some	possibilities	have	also	been	proven	to	be	 inefficient	 from	the	point	of	view	of	productivity	–	free	 labor	produces	common	value	or	goods	 in	greater	quantity	and	with	more	quality	 than	capital	 can,	 as	 it	 is	nowadays	 limited	 to	an	unpredictable	valorization	of	 capital	 in	perverse	financial,	rentier	and	virtual	forms.		
Civil	disobedience		 José	Antonio	Estévez	Araujo	understands	civil	disobedience	to	be	illegal,	public	and	non-violent	action,	whose	aim	is	to	change	a	certain	law	or	governmental	policy	(Estévez	Araujo,	1994,	p.	22).	According	to	this	definition,	it	seems	that	civil	disobedience	can	only	be	practiced	under	 the	 terms	of	 a	 given	 legal	 system,	 respecting	 it	 in	 general	 and	aiming	only	 to	 change	certain	specific	aspects	of	it.	This	understanding	of	civil	disobedience	has	been	developed	by	many	authors	dealing	with	this	subject	in	the	context	of	the	constituted	power.	The	 above	 definition	 notwithstanding,	 even	 some	 theorists	 who	 understand	 civil	disobedience	 to	 be	 the	 expression	 of	 constituted	 power	 recognize	 that	 it	 can,	 in	 extreme	circumstances,	 turn	 into	 criticism	 of	 the	 political	 and	 legal	 system	 as	 a	 whole,	 as	 the	disobedient	 actions	 demanded	 by	 Gandhi	 clearly	 demonstrated	 –	 initially	 focusing	 on	discriminatory	 policies	 implemented	 by	 the	 British	 government,	 they	 developed	 into	 a	
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campaign	against	the	whole	colonial	system	to	which	India	had	been	subjected	(Arendt,	1972,	p.	77;	Estévez	Araujo,	1994,	p.	28-29).		This	 situation	 demonstrates	 that	 civil	 disobedience,	 more	 than	 a	 self-correction	mechanism	 for	 constituted	 law,	 can	 work	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 a	 constituent	 power	 put	 to	marching	 by	 a	 dis-instituting	 power,	 as	 seen	 above,	 since	 it	 exceeds	 the	 given	positive	 law,	presenting	itself	as	a	true	legal	source,	and	not	as	a	result	or	product	of	the	system.	For	civil	disobedience	 to	 fulfill	 this	 role,	 the	 presence	 of	 specific	 circumstances	 is	 needed;	 from	 the	point	of	view	of	 this	article,	 it	must	be	adequately	grounded	 in	a	 radical-democratic	 idea	of	law.	The	given	hypothesis	is	that	nowadays	these	circumstances	exist	in	the	form	of	a	state	of	
permanent	 economic	 exception.	 More	 than	 simply	 colonizing	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 the	 economic	exception	has	transformed	it.	It	seems	that	a	point	of	no	return	has	been	reached,	resulting	in	the	rapid	dismantling	of	liberal	rights	and	guarantees.	Although	they	have	never	functioned	at	their	 maximum	 potential,	 like	many	 other	 human	 endeavors,	 liberal	 rights	 and	 guarantees	have	played	an	 important	historical	 role	by	partially	 voicing	 the	plight	of	 the	 exploited	and	oppressed	in	political	debate	and	experience.		It	is	important	to	underline	that	civil	disobedience	is	not	the	only	–	and	perhaps	not	even	the	most	 important	–	structure	through	which	the	constituent	power	expresses	 itself.	There	are	many	other	forms	of	expression,	both	passive	(such	as	a	revolutionary	general	strike)	and	active	(insurrection,	armed	resistance,	revolution,	etc.),	whose	objective	is	the	transformation	of	 the	 political-legal-economic	 system	 of	 exception	 as	 a	 whole.	 Many	 of	 these	 forms	 of	constituent	power	resort	to	violent	methods	which,	however,	are	not	illegitimate	per	se.	The	ideas	outlined	by	Schmitt	and	Benjamin	on	the	symbiosis	of	law	and	violence	cannot	be	overlooked.	Indeed,	the	normativity	we	are	now	familiar	with	stems	from	original	acts	of	land	 appropriation	 (Schmitt,	 1974),	 which	 were	 then	 justified	 through	 mythologizing	 and	moralizing	 metaphors.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 legal	 system	 monopolized	 the	 use	 of	 violence,	 now	understood	 to	 be	 the	 absolute	 property	 of	 law	 (Benjamin,	 1999).	 Nonetheless,	 one	 cannot	forget	the	historical	(and	not	ontological)	character	of	Schmitt’s	and	Benjamin’s	theses,	since	they	concern	a	specific	experience	of	 law	–	the	Western	one,	which	first	appeared	in	Greece	and	currently	manifests	 itself	as	capitalist	 law	based	on	appropriation	–	and	not	all	possible	legal	experience.	Power	 and	normativity,	 rather	 than	 violence	 and	hierarchy,	 are	 the	 key	 elements	 in	 all	legal	spheres.	If,	in	the	present	system,	these	dyads	are	often	mistaken	for	one	another,	this	is	due	to	the	identification	of	what	exists	–	capitalist	law	–	with	what	can	exist;	i.e.,	other	forms	of	 law.	 If	 we	 take	 Agamben’s	 invitation	 to	 “the	 coming	 generation”	 to	 conceive	 of	 a	 legal	paradigm	in	which	violence	is	genuinely	disabled,	then	civil	disobedience	stands	out	from	the	multiple	 constituent	 forms	 of	 this	 new	 legal	 experience	 precisely	 due	 to	 its	 non-violent	character.	 In	mystical	 terms,	 it	 does	not	 accumulate	karma,	 nor	activates	 the	mechanism	of	capitalist	 law	 –	 which	 always	 requires	 more	 violence	 in	 order	 to	 justify	 its	 grounds	 and	consequences.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 civil	 disobedience	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 radically	argumentative	 legal	 institution	 –	 more	 than	 any	 argumentation	 theory	 linked	 to	 the	constituted	powers,	which	are	violent	by	nature,	could	ever	admit.	Estévez	Araujo	classifies	the	traditional	conceptions	of	civil	disobedience	by	stating	that	one	can	either	understand	them	as	a	form	of	constitutional	review,	whereby	the	constitutional	validity	of	a	certain	law	is	directly	questioned	through	an	act	of	disobedience,	or	as	the	direct	
exercise	 of	 rights	 already	 recognized	 by	 the	 Constitution.	 This	 occurs,	 for	 example,	when	 the	disobedient	 ignore	 an	 official	 prohibition	 to	 protest	 and	 demonstrate.	 While	 constitutional	
review	takes	an	active	approach	to	legislative	power,	the	direct	exercise	of	rights	adopts	a	more	passive	 approach,	 turning	 against	 the	 measures	 and	 decisions	 of	 the	 judicial	 or	 executive	
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powers.	 It	 is	 vital	 to	 note	 that	 in	 both	 situations	 the	 disobedient	 question	 the	weighting	 of	values	 and	 principles	 by	 the	 public	 authorities	 in	 their	 creation	 or	 enforcement	 of	 laws,	 in	order	 to	 show	 that	 certain	 opinions,	 circumstances	 and	 points	 of	 view	 have	 not	 been	adequately	 considered	 (Estévez	Araujo,	 1994,	 p.	 144-145).	 Clearly,	 these	 understandings	 of	civil	 disobedience	are	 rooted	 in	 the	need	 to	 activate	public	opinion,	 compelling	 it	 to	 amend	decisions	 made	 by	 the	 three	 classical	 branches	 of	 sovereign	 power.	 However,	 the	 deeply	antidemocratic	nature	of	such	power	remains	in	its	essence,	unquestioned.		While	any	relevant	legal-political	transformation	necessarily	undergoes	the	mediation	of	the	 market	 and	 State-capital	 powers,	 dis-institution	 sponsored	 by	 civil	 disobedience	 is	essential	 to	ensure	the	continuity	of	constituent	power.	It	 is	an	 important	–	although	not	the	only	 –	way	 to	 fight	 for	 the	 constitution	 of	 truly	 democratic	 “rights	 to	 come”,	which	 are	 not	based	on	the	proprietary	and	violent	nómos,	which	–	explicitly	or	implicitly	–	marks	the	post-modern	experience	of	normativity.	It	is	clear	that	conceptions	which	reduce	the	function	of	civil	disobedience	to	scenarios	of	institutional	normality	should	fail,	since	they	see	civil	disobedience	as	an	outlet	or,	at	best,	a	self-correcting	or	self-integrating	mechanism	of	the	law.	In	these	cases,	the	disobedient	action	is	constrained	to	assuming	the	validity	of	the	current	political	and	legal	structure	as	a	whole,	questioning	only	specific	aspects	without	addressing	a	general	dis-institution	of	the	system.		Nonetheless,	the	situation	in	which	the	democratic	rule	of	law	is	immersed	today	can	only	be	 understood	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 permanent	 economic	 exception,	 in	which	 the	 union	 of	 State,	finance	 and	 the	 market	 is	 evident.	 This	 union	makes	 a	 de	 facto	 determination	 of	 the	 anti-popular	direction	of	policies	and	 the	 limitlessness	of	private	capitalist	power,	as	well	as	 the	sidelining	of	historical	achievements	attained	by	movements,	originating	 in	 the	18th	 century	fight	 for	 rights	 and	 later	 radicalized	 by	 workers,	 black	 rights	 groups,	 feminists	 and	 others	during	the	19th	and	20th	centuries.		In	this	context,	understanding	civil	disobedience	merely	as	a	self-correcting	device	of	the	constituted	power	denies	its	transformative	and	democratic	potential.	It	is	seen	as	one	of	the	various	 technical	 mechanisms	 controlled	 and	 approved	 by	 the	 State/market,	 and	 can	 only	play	a	 rhetorical	 role,	demonstrating	 the	 so-called	normality	of	 a	 legal	 system	 that	has	 long	been	 exhausted.	 Indeed,	 this	 system	 is	 now	 immune	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 any	 real	 reform	capable	of	putting	at	stake	the	privatist,	selfish	and	individualist	grounds	on	which	it	is	based,	as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 socio-political	 crisis	 currently	 ravaging	 Brazil.	 It	 seems	 not	 only	inappropriate,	but	also	contradictory	to	derive	the	foundations	of	civil	disobedience	from	the	principles	 of	 a	 nomic-proprietary	 system	 historically	 based	 on	 separation,	 hierarchy	 and	violence	–	characteristics	entirely	opposed	to	the	defining	traits	of	civil	disobedience,	which	is	public,	horizontal	and	peaceful.	In	the	current	system,	it	is	critically	urgent	to	develop	radical	politics,	 capable	of	proposing	something	other	 than	a	new	 form	of	violence,	even	 if	 it	 is	not	monopolized	 by	 the	 proprietary	 nómos.	 This	 is	 the	 only	 way	 to	 escape	 from	 the	 total	subjection	engendered	by	late-capitalism,	by	which	the	contemplative	subjection	guaranteed	by	 the	 society	 of	 the	 spectacle	 justifies	 itself	 and	 remains	 bound	 to	 the	 legalized	 and	institutionalized	violence	typical	of	the	state	of	exception.	In	the	imperial	world	of	permanent	economic	exception,	production	and	action	need	to	be	absolute,	uninterrupted	and	irreflexive.	This	 is	why	every	violent	resistance	 imposed	on	the	system	makes	 it	stronger,	by	activating	new	control	and	subjection	mechanisms.		In	 fact,	 the	 state	 of	 exception	 can	 only	 survive	 and	 thrive	 if	 it	 is	 constantly	 justified	 by	resistance,	 which	 questions	 it	 and,	 thus,	 paradoxically,	 necessitates	 and	 maintains	 it.	 In	opposition	 to	Foucault’s	 ideas,	 resistance	 is	 not	 in	 fact	 the	 other	 side	 of	power,	 but	 power	itself.	Resisting	the	state	of	exception,	despite	there	being	good	reasons	and	arguments	to	do	
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so,	is	only	a	way	of	activating	the	power	which	rests	in	the	productive	and	reproductive	action	of	 a	 divided	 social	world.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 “undergoing	 a	 rebellion	 is	 not	 an	 effective	alternative	against	the	permanent	exception,	for	non-stop	rebelling	is	the	most	important	rule	imposed	by	such	exception”	(Valdencantos,	2014,	p.	156).	This	is	clearly	demonstrated	by	the	social	 struggles	 of	 2011-2013,	which	 spanned	 the	US,	 Latin	America	 and	Europe.	While	 the	explosion	of	popular	indignation	was	primarily	seen	as	legitimate,	it	was	soon	used	to	justify	an	 unprecedented	 deepening	 of	 the	 exception,	 at	 least	 in	 so-called	 “democratic”	 States.	 For	example,	due	to	the	notorious	Ley	Mordaza	in	Spain,	many	laws	and	administrative	measures	which	criminalized	the	public	questioning	of	the	capitalist	order	were	approved,	including	the	absurd	 violation	 of	 fundamental	 principles	 such	 as	 the	 presumption	 of	 innocence,	 the	 due	process	of	law,	the	right	to	information,	the	right	to	privacy	and	the	right	to	protest.	In	Brazil,	this	process	was	particularly	clear.	After	the	shock	of	the	2013	protests,	when	a	series	 of	 acentric,	 horizontal	 and	 spontaneous	 movements	 took	 over	 the	 streets	 of	 major	Brazilian	cities,	hampered	the	progress	of	the	Confederations	Cup	and	prevented	an	increase	in	 public	 transport	 fares,	 the	 exceptional	 power	 was	 able	 to	 portray	 such	 movements	 as	symbols	of	barbarism	and	disorder,	 later	engineering	containment,	 intimidation	and	control	structures	 seldom	 experienced	 previously	 in	 the	 country.	 It	was	 thanks	 to	 these	 structures	that	the	World	Cup	took	place	in	Brazil	without	any	major	incidents.	However,	the	apparent	victory	 resulting	 in	 the	 retreat	 of	 the	 State	 and	 its	 economic	 partners	 from	 the	 increase	 in	public	transport	fares	in	2013	was	rapidly	reversed	in	2015,	and	this	time	the	media	did	not	report	 the	extreme	violence	used	by	 the	police	during	protests	 in	 São	Paulo,	Rio	de	 Janeiro	and	Belo	Horizonte.	In	just	a	few	days,	the	movement	was	discredited	and	integrated	into	the	triumphal	 narrative	 that	 the	 order	 produces	 about	 itself.	 In	 political	 life,	 as	 in	 physics,	 for	every	action	there	is	a	reaction,	but	in	terms	of	human	struggle	the	reaction	rarely	happens	in	the	same	direction,	and	its	intensity	is	far	from	being	proportional.	That	is	why	we	must	value	the	dis-instituting	and	constituent	potentialities	of	inaction,	as	proposed	by	civil	disobedience.	In	 the	 interpretation	 adopted	 in	 this	 article	 –	 according	 to	which	 constituent	 power	 is	closely	related	to	dis-instituting	power	–	civil	disobedience,	if	considered	beyond	the	limits	of	the	 traditional	 reformist	 and	 liberal	 interpretations,	 seems	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	most	 adequate	mechanisms	 for	 thinking	 and	 acting	 in	 a	 dis-instituting	 way.	 Additionally,	 it	 has	 a	 vitally	strategic	advantage:	it	is	not	violent.	Therefore,	civil	disobedience	cannot	be	directly	attached	to	the	forms	of	State-capital	action,	which	have	an	inherent	need	to	monopolize	violence.	Non-violence	is	central	to	the	success	of	disobedient	action	opposed	to	constituted	power,	since	 the	 violent	 practices	 of	 social	movements	with	 reasonable	 demands	 are	 only	 used	 to	justify	 the	 State’s	 most	 ruthless	 responses.	 The	 non-violent	 strategy	 does	 not	 only	 aim	 to	rouse	the	opponent’s	sense	of	morality	–	as	Gandhi	intended	–	but	also	attempts	to	turn	public	opinion	 against	 the	 State	 and,	 instead,	 favor	 the	 disobedient,	 who	 want	 to	 institute	 new	political	and	legal	structures	(Estévez	Araujo,	1994,	p.	26).	To	such	an	argumentative-strategic	perspective	one	needs	to	add	the	institutional	aspect,	according	to	which	the	use	of	violence	by	 resistance	 organizations	 is	 strictly	 prohibited	 within	 constitutional	 democracies	 (Ebert,	1988,	 p.	 93).	 The	 non-violent	 strategy	makes	 it	 easier	 for	 civil	 disobedience	 to	 be	 seen	 as	legitimate	in	the	context	of	the	constituted	power	it	wishes	to	criticize	and	overcome.			
Conclusions		As	revealed	by	Costa	Douzinas,	 the	act	of	disobedience	makes	it	possible	to	disassociate	people’s	 actions,	 conduct	 and	 behavior	 from	 the	 capitalist	 economic	 matrix,	 centered	 on	
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consumption,	 debt	 and	 moral	 judgment	 which	 is	 imposed	 on	 the	 lower	 classes,	 who	 are	continually	asked	to	resist	the	harmful	effects	of	the	permanent	economic	crisis	we	live	in.	By	questioning	the	alleged	continuum	between	 law	and	 justice,	disobedience	no	 longer	appears	as	an	individual	act	of	moralizing	character,	but	rather	as	a	collective	and	emancipatory	social	practice,	capable	of	constituting	new	forms	of	subjectivity	by	removing	the	subject	 from	the	desire-consumption-frustration	cycle	(Douzinas,	2015,	p.	175-176).	The	ontological	act	of	disobedience	need	not	be	organized	by	a	political	party,	labor	union	or	any	other	centralizing	structure,	being	rather	a	movement	centered	on	resistance	and	on	the	fight	for	the	right	to	have	rights.	It	is,	therefore,	the	political	starting	point	from	which	new	forms	of	 subjectivity	may	be	constituted	 (Douzinas,	2013).	 It	 is	vital	 to	 create	 restraint-free	ways	 to	 perceive	 our	 social	 reality	 and	 being	 in	 the	 world,	 dismantling	 proprietary	 and	hierarchical	forms	of	subjectivity	by	deactivating	the	institutions	which	reproduce	them	daily.	In	 order	 to	 accomplish	 this	 task,	 civil	 disobedience	 must	 play	 a	 central	 role.	 It	 must	 be	embodied	 not	 only	 within	 the	 abstract	 ideas	 discussed	 here,	 but	 within	 concrete	 actions:	abandoning	 work,	 promoting	 general	 strikes	 in	 public	 services,	 not	 paying	 taxes	 and	 fees,	abstaining	 from	 voting	 on	 a	 large	 scale,	 eschewing	 the	 banking	 system,	 increasing	 co-operativism,	etc.	In	contradiction	with	her	final	thesis,	Hannah	Arendt	indicates	that	civil	disobedience,	as	an	extra-legal	phenomenon,	has	effective	revolutionary	potential.	Having	noted	that	all	human	societies	change,	being	in	constant	flux	–	and	thus	in	need	of	stability	–	Arendt	states	that	the	law	 can	 bring	 stability	 and	 normalize	 such	 changes	 after	 they	 occur,	 but	 that	 the	 changes	themselves	result	 from	the	action	of	extralegal	potentialities	(Arendt,	1972,	p.	80);	 i.e.,	 from	something	 beyond	 the	 law,	 such	 as	 constituent	 power.	 Perhaps	 this	 is	 why	 –	 almost	unwillingly	 –	 she	 arrives	 at	 a	 conclusion	 very	 similar	 to	 the	 one	 developed	 in	 this	 article,	confirming	that	civil	disobedience	is	one	of	the	possible	answers	to	the	crisis	in	political	and	legal	 institutions.	 The	 state	 of	 economic	 exception	 has	 become	 the	 rule,	 and	 the	 daily	emergency	 created	 by	 disaster	 capitalism	 cannot	 be	 overcome	 by	 a	 new	 global	 nómos,	 as	predicted	 by	 Carl	 Schmitt,	 but	 rather	 by	 a	 deactivation	 that	 only	 the	 disobedient	 and	 his	radical	refusal	can	implement.		
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